THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN-SPANISH RELATIONS IN 1782 by Dr. Hüseyin Serdar TABAKOĞLU
THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN-SPANISH  
RELATIONS IN 1782 
Hüseyin Serdar TABAKOĞLU
∗ 
 
 
ÖZET 
Osmanlı  İmparatorluğu ve İspanya arasındaki münasebetler daha çok 
16.yüzyılda; iki devletin de Akdeniz coğrafyası içinde siyasi egemenlik 
mücadelesi içine girdikleri dönemde yoğunlaşmış ve zirveye ulaşmıştır. 
Ancak 16. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren iki devlet de yeni siyasi rakiplerle 
karşılaşmış ve karşılıklı olarak mücadeleyi terketmişlerdir. Ancak iki 
devlet arasında sadece bir ateşkes imzalanmış, resmi bir barış 
antlaşması imzalanmamıştır. 17. ve 18. yüzyıllar boyunca bu Osmanlı ve 
İspanya imparatorlukları gitgide güçten düşmüş ve dünya siyasetinde 
önde gelen konumlarını kaybetmişlerdir. Bu makale 1782 yılında 
imzalanan Osmanlı-İspanya ahidnamesi ile ilişkilerin yeniden 
kurulmasını ve iki devlet arasındaki tarihsel benzerlikleri konu 
almaktadır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı, İspanya, Bouligny, Ahidname. 
 
ABSTARCT 
The political relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish empires 
around the Mediterranean reached its peak during the 16th century. 
However, these two great powers were challenged by the new powers and 
due to this threat they abandon the struggle around the Mediterranean 
by the end of the 16th century. The Ottomans and the Spanish sign a 
truce rather than a formal peace. Throughout the 17th and the 18th 
centuries the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires lost their power as the 
primary forces in the world politics. This article aims to understand the 
Ottoman-Spanish Peace Treaty in 1782, and bring a comparative look to 
the Ottoman-Spanish relations. 
Key Words: The Ottoman Empire, Spain, Bouligny, Ahidname.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The Ottoman-Spanish relations can be perceived differently 
according to the historical conjuncture. For example, we see no 
direct relations between the Ottomans and the Spanish until the 16th 
century. Although Catalan merchants and corsairs were active in the 
Mediterranean, they were mostly limited to the western edge of the 
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Mediterranean basin. The 16th century, however, witnessed the rise 
of empires around the Mediterranean as Braudel emphasized. One of 
these empires was the Ottomans who controlled the Eastern 
Mediterranean for the rest of the period of engagement while the 
other empire was the Habsburgs. In the beginning of my article, I 
would focus on the Spanish branch of the Habsburg Empire and look 
into the nature of the relations between the Ottoman and the 
Spanish Empires. Then, I would try to explain the changing positions 
of the Ottoman and the Spanish and their efforts to keep their status 
in the 17th century when both of them were challenged by the newly 
rising powers. In the end, the reasons for the Ottomans to agree on 
the re-establishment of the Ottoman-Spanish relations in 1782 
would form the basis of my article. 
In my research, I tried to focus on the documents in the 
Ottoman archives but I could not reach much countable data on the 
Ottoman-Spanish relations. That is why, I mainly used the Turkish 
and English secondary sources. The famous work of Fernand 
Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age 
of Philip II probably keeps its status as the best source on the 16th 
century Mediterranean. I used this monumental work to explain the 
nature of relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires at 
that period. For the 18th century, there are not enough primary 
sources except for İspanya Ahkâm Defteri in the Ottoman archives. 
In addition, Tarih-i Cevdet by Ahmet Cevdet Paşa is one of my main 
sources for this period since it includes vast information about the 
negotiations with the Spanish envoy and it also has copies of some 
parts of the Ottoman chronicles.  
In the academic field, there is much more focus on the 
Ottoman-Spanish relations in the 16th century, but there is very little 
research on the 18th. That is the reason why I would try to 
understand the needs of the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th 
century and reveal the position of the Ottoman-Spanish re-
approachment within that framework. In that period, the Ottomans 
had to deal with the Russian aggression as well as the Austrian 
hostility. The two shocks forced the Ottomans to re-think their 
strategies. This first shock was the Battle of Çeşme in 1770 when the 
Russian fleet, for the first time, entered the Mediterranean and 
disturbed the Ottoman territories. The second one was the loss of 
Crimea as a result of the Russian victory. These shocks certainly 
shaped the direction of the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th 
century. We do not know if there was a major plan to contain the 
Russian aggression but we may estimate that the Ottomans did 
everything to avoid further shocks and disasters.  
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1. THE OTTOMAN-SPANISH STRUGGLE 
1.1. The Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Habsburg Spain in the 16th Century  
The Ottoman-Spanish relations in the 16th century was a 
reflection of the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle in this age, because 
prior to this date, we see no direct political and commercial relations 
between these two powers. Before the unification of Spain under 
Catholic monarchs Isabella and Fernando in the 15th century, there 
were largely Catalan commercial and political activity in the 
Mediterranean. There was a Catalan trade colony in Constantinople 
which had still been an important commercial center.1 We know 
Catalan mercenaries served in Anatolia and in the Balkans under the 
Byzantine command and sometimes independently.2 Catalan 
corsairs were also active in the Western Mediterranean in the 14th 
and 15th centuries.3 
                                                
The Ottoman-Spanish interaction occurred in the beginning 
of the 16th century when the Habsburg prince Karl was crowned as 
the King of Spain and became Carlos I in 1516.4 Thus, a new enemy 
occurred in the western Mediterranean. When the Spanish King was 
re-crowned as the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Karl V in 
15195, he unified the Mediterranean and European fronts against 
the Ottoman advance. On the other hand, there was a serious 
internal problem for the Holy Roman Empire, actually the rise of 
Protestantism. It was especially effective in the German provinces of 
the Empire, and made things very difficult for Karl V since he also 
had to deal with the Ottoman campaigns towards Hungary, and the 
imperial capital Vienna could again be in danger as it was in 1529. 
Karl V organized a Spanish counter attack to the Ottoman port at 
Koron in the Morea in 1532 as a part of a defensive strategy which 
aimed to distract the Ottoman authorities who were busy with the 
Hungarian campaign, and were clearly able to threaten Vienna for 
 
1 C a t a l a n s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  g e t  a  d i s t r i c t  f o r  t h e i r  t r a d e  c o l o n y  i n  1 4 5 1 .  S e e  R o b e r t  
Mantran,  İstanbul Tarihi, trans. Teoman Tunçdoğan (İstanbul:  İletişim Yayınları, 
2001), 179. 
2 Mantran, 149. 
3 John H. Pryor, Akdeniz’de Coğrafya, Teknoloji ve Savaş: Araplar, Bizanslılar ve 
Türkler, trans. Füsün Tayaç and Tunç Tayaç (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 187. 
4 Stephen J. Lee, Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler 1494-1789, trans. Ertürk Demirel 
(Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2004), 59. 
5 Lee, 30. 
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the second time.6 Although the Spanish forces under Andrea D’Oria 
managed to capture Koron, it was impossible to keep that position 
which was too far from the logistic centers of the Spanish Empire.7  
As the Ottoman Empire had technical as well as logistical 
problems in the Western Mediterranean, the Holy Roman Empire had 
also difficulties in the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean 
because of the limitations of the 16th century galley warfare. A year 
after the capture of Koron by the Spanish, Turkish corsair Barbaros 
Hayreddin was appointed Kaptan-i Derya b y  S ü l e y m a n  I ,  w h o  
understood the necessity of forming a significant navy against the 
Spanish Empire, and Barbaros re-organized the Ottoman fleet in 
order to increase its operational capability for offensive tactics, 
especially in the Western Mediterranean. As a result, Koron was 
recaptured in September 1534 because the Spanish soldiers were 
starving and they had no hope of getting support. The impossibility 
of supporting a garrison in Koron was well-known by the Habsburg 
forces but Karl V was willing to have any moral support which may 
be provided by this courageous offensive campaign8. The field of the 
Ottoman-Spanish struggle was the Mediterranean as it was also the 
centre of international relations in the 16th century. The Ottomans 
had the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and advanced along 
the Northern Africa where the major land campaigns against the 
Spanish Empire were fought during the 16th century. The Ottoman 
admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa’s acts most probably were 
designed to strengthen the Ottoman positions in North Africa. 
1.1.1. North Africa  
North Africa which had critical importance due to its 
proximity to the Western Mediterranean and the Spanish ports, was 
another dimension of the Ottoman-Spanish struggle. The Ottoman 
naval forces under the command of Barbaros managed to seize Tunis 
in August 1534, but Karl V could not tolerate the Ottoman control of 
the Sicilian channel since it would provide a great strategic 
advantage to the Ottomans.9 As a result, Karl V assembled an army 
of 26.000 men and sailed for Tunis in 1535. Barbaros decided to 
evacuate Tunis due to the overwhelming enemy forces. On the other 
hand, in stead of establishing direct Spanish rule over Tunis, Karl V 
decided to restore Hafşid dynasty under a tributary relationship with 
                                                 
6 Özlem Kumrular, “Koron Seferi: Uzak Topraklarda İmkânsız Misyon,” Toplumsal 
Tarih, no. 127 (July 2004), 79. 
7 Kumrular, 78. 
8 Kumrular, 78-79. 
9 A n d r e w  C .  H e s s ,  The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-
African Frontier (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 72. 
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Spain.10 Karl V was determined to sweep away the Ottoman presence 
in North Africa and in order to achieve this goal he planned to attack 
the last Ottoman stronghold in the region in 1541. The target was 
Algeria which had served Muslim corsairs as a safe harbor and 
became a base for Ottomans who organized attacks to the Spanish 
coastal towns and ports. The Spanish force was composed of 65 
galleys, 450 support ships and 24.000 infantry while Hadim Hasan 
Ağa, the defender of Algeria, had approximately 6.000 soldiers. 
However, heavy rain and storm shattered the ships and broke the 
discipline of the Spanish army. In addition, the Ottoman 
counterattack forced Karl V to evacuate his army.11 While Karl V 
focused on the Western Mediterranean defense, Tripoli fell in 155112 
to the Ottoman forces which were under the command of Sinan 
Paşa. Karl V was reluctant to resume expensive naval wars against 
the Ottoman Empire since he had been working against the rising 
Protestantism among the German princes.13  
The Ottomans continued to raid the Western Mediterranean 
ports and towns but there was no Spanish imperial campaign as it 
was the case in 1535 and 1541. In stead of dealing with the 
Ottomans in the Mediterranean front, the Habsburg ruler decided to 
solve the problems with the Protestant German princes who 
successfully exploited the Ottoman advance deep into Europe in 
their negotiations with Karl V.14 The Ottoman Empire closely 
watched the development s  i n  E u r o p e  s u c h  a s  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  
Protestantism, and the Ottomans tried to coordinate the timing of 
their campaigns according to the uprisings within the Holy Roman 
Empire.15 In 1556, Karl V left Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and 
Croatia to his brother Ferdinand, the throne of Spain, Flanders and 
Italian estates were left to his son, Philip, and the reign of Philip II 
has begun. Between 1556 and 1598 Philip II had to deal with many 
strategic problems which were: the Ottoman expansion in the 
Mediterranean region, uprisings in the Low Countries, hostility from 
England and France. Philip II decided to give priority to the Ottoman 
expansion in the Mediterranean since his uncle Ferdinand would 
deal with the European front.16 
                                                 
10 Hess, 73. 
11 Hess, 74. 
12 Hess, 75-76. 
13 Hess, 75. 
14 A. Fisher Galati, Türk Cihadı ve Alman Protestanlığı, 1551-1555, trans. Nevâl Öke 
(İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992), 116-117. 
15 The Ottoman threat played an important role in the official recognition of 
Protestantism by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. See Galati, 133. 
16 Lee, 71-72. 
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Philip II’s naval strategy for the Mediterranean aimed to 
contain the Ottoman threat in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the 
peace with the French at Cateau-Cambrésis  on  April 3, 155917, 
Philip II had a chance to realize his plan. The first target was Gerba 
near Tripoli for the purpose of containing Ottoman and corsair 
activities against the Spanish ports. However, the Spanish assault on 
Gerba was repelled by the Ottoman forces in 1560. After this defeat, 
Philip II decided to strengthen his naval and land forces for a more 
effective defensive strategy in the Western Mediterranean.18 On the 
other hand, the Ottoman policy was to expand towards the Western 
Mediterranean and it was necessary to control the central 
Mediterranean passageways in order to achieve this goal. That is 
why, the Ottoman admiral Piyale Paşa directed the attack on Malta 
in 1565. In addition to strengthening the Ottoman position in the 
central Mediterranean, the Ottoman concerns focused on two points: 
the first on the elimination of Christian corsairs and secondly on 
securing the safety of Muslim pilgrims who were going to the Holy 
lands. While the idea of elimination of the Christian base in this 
central passageway reflects a strategic sense, the protection of the 
Muslim pilgrims shows the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire as 
the major Islamic power in the Mediterranean region. At the end of a 
long siege, the Ottomans failed to seize Malta and evacuated the 
island. This event also shows the limits of the 16th century galley 
warfare because the naval season was from mid-April to beginning of 
October, and it was very difficult to capture a heavily fortified 
position like Malta in such a short period with a limited logistic 
support.19 
The Spanish Empire, on the other hand, was a Christian 
power and claimed the leadership of the Catholic Christian world. 
The imperial struggle between the Spanish and the Ottomans had 
characteristics of the east-west confrontation because these great 
powers divided the Mediterranean as their field of struggle and 
dominated the international relations in the 16th century. In 1568 
the Moriscos – Hispano-Muslims who had only officially been 
converted to Christianity, revolted against the Spanish authority 
because of the policies of Philip II towards the assimilation of the 
Morisco community of the Iberian peninsula.20 The Ottomans did not 
hesitate to support this uprising through their forces in the North 
                                                 
17 Hess, 78. 
18 For the foreign policy of Philip II see Lee, 72. 
19 Hess, 84-85. 
20 Philip II sought to assimilate the Moriscos in Spain by changing their customs and 
clothing.  See Andrew C. Hess “The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-
Century Spain,” The American Historical Review, vol. 74, no. 1 (October, 1968), 5. 
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Africa.21 The Moriscos may have been expected to serve as the 
Ottoman fifth column in Spain or at least they might be useful for 
espionage and diversion for other Ottoman operations in the 
Mediterranean.22 When Philip II had to pull back his troops from 
Italy under Don Juan de Austria to crush the Morisco rebellion, the 
Ottoman Empire benefited from this power gap and Tunis, which 
became a serious obstacle between the Ottoman provinces of Algiers 
and Tripoli, was seized by the Ottoman forces in 1569.23 In addition, 
the main Ottoman fleet sailed for Cyprus in 1570 to secure the flow 
of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and to strengthen the 
Empire’s position.24 
1.1.2. The Battle of Lepanto  
The loss of Cyprus caused a Venetian policy of approach 
towards the Christian powers like Spain to recover her losses. Pope 
Pius V also emphasized the Christian unity and call for the formation 
of the Holy League against the "infidel" Turks. After long and 
exhausting negotiations, the Holy Alliance was signed by the Papacy, 
the Spanish Empire and Venice on  May 20, 1571.25 Don Juan de 
Austria was given the supreme command of the allied forces, and 
financial burden was distributed among the allies according to their 
strength.26 The Christian fleet was composed of nearly 200 galleys 
and 6 Venetian galleasses and manpower was formed by Italian, 
Spanish and German troops. The Christian forces were better 
equipped in terms of cannons and arquebuses.27 The Christian fleet 
encountered the Ottoman armada composed of 230 galleys, near the 
bay of Lepanto on October 7, 1571. The Ottoman fleet was unable to 
outmaneuver the Christian armada and was forced to have a direct 
clash in which the Christians had the advantage. The result of this 
battle was the total destruction of the Ottoman naval forces except 
for the 30 galleys under Uluç Ali Paşa who managed to escape 
through the Christian flanks.28 
                                                 
21 Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 88-89 and “Moriscos”, 15. 
22 Hess, “Moriscos”, 5-6, 23-24. 
23 Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 89. 
24 Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı  İmparatorluğu Tarihi, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, ed. Kemal 
Beydilli, vol. III (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 127. 
25 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean  and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, vol. II (London: Fontana/Collins, 1976), 1089. 
26 Braudel, 1090. 
27 Braudel, 1102. 
28 John F. Guilmartin, “The Tactics of the Battle of Lepanto Clarified: The Impact of 
Social, Economic, and Political Factors on Sixteenth Century Galley Warfare,” New 
Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, 
United States Naval Academy 25-26 October 1979, edited by Craig l. Symonds 
(Annapolis, Maryland: the United States Naval Institute, 1981), 10 and Jorga, 137. 
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After the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto, Don Juan de Austria 
invaded Tunis in 1573, and a new fortress was built at La Goletta, 
which was garrisoned with the Spanish soldiers, in order to create 
deterrence for a future Ottoman assault.29  Although the battle of 
Lepanto was a serious military defeat for the Ottomans, it could not 
be exploited by the Holy League and they could not turn it into a 
strategic success, thus the Holy League collapsed. On the other 
hand, the Ottomans successfully built a new armada the next year 
thanks to their enormous resources. The battle of Lepanto marked 
an era which shows the end of the Mediterranean-oriented world 
politics and the beginning of an Atlantic-oriented one instead since 
both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires had tendencies to leave the 
struggle. Although the Mediterranean did not lose its importance 
immediately, it started to decline even though it kept its 
characteristics as a major field of struggle between the East and the 
West. The most important effect of Lepanto however was a 
psychological one, because it ended the myth of the Ottoman 
supremacy in the Mediterranean.  
Despite of the initial military consequences of Lepanto, the 
battle itself was far from damaging Ottoman position in the 
Mediterranean. The Ottomans not only defended their positions, but 
they also launched a series of counterattacks in order to restore their 
damaged prestige and self-respect. First of all, the  Ottomans 
achieved the re-building of the armada under the grand vizier 
Sokollu Mehmet Paşa, and by the help of this military force, they 
continued their expansion into North Africa. Secondly, the Pope Pius 
V who was the spiritual leader of the Christian alliance, died in 
157230 and the Venetians left the Holy League and made a separate 
peace agreement on March 7, 1573 with the Ottomans in order to 
protect their commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
normalize31 their relations with the Ottomans.32 For the Spanish 
side of the struggle, the Ottomans made their preparations to hit the 
Spanish forces at Tunis which was chosen as the target of the 
Ottoman counterattack. The Ottoman armada sailed under the 
admiral Sinan Paşa and reached Tunis in 1574. On  August 24, 
Sinan Paşa managed to capture the fortified Spanish position of La 
Goletta and the remaining Spanish forces in Tunis surrendered on 
                                                 
29 Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 93. 
30 Braudel, 1115. 
31 Venetians mostly depended on the Ottoman grain in order to feed their cities, and 
the expenses of war were forcing the limits of this wealthy state which lives on her 
commercial lifelines. See Braudel, 1125, and Jorga, 140. 
32 Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 92, also see Braudel, 1137. 
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September 13, when they lost their hope of getting any support from 
the Spanish Empire.33 
Although the Ottoman Empire was having difficulties in 
finding enough number of experienced sailors and oarsmen for the 
navy, it was still a fearful enemy in terms of material power and their 
production capacity in their shipyards. The naval and overseas 
campaigns became too expensive with the developments in the 
tactics and the military technology. Thus the Spanish Empire was 
not willing to continue her engagement with the Ottomans in the 
Mediterranean in which there was a limited gain from costly naval 
battles and overseas assaults. This is the reason why Spain turned 
its attention to the Atlantic Ocean and Anglo-Spanish competition 
and concentrated its power to crush the Dutch uprising which had 
been a troublesome issue.34 
Towards the end of the 16th century while the Spanish 
Empire was dealing with England and the Dutch revolts, the 
Ottoman Empire directed its power to the Safavid Iran which was 
becoming a political threat as well as an ideological one in the east. 
Another rival was the rising northern power, Russia, which had 
already captured Kazan in 1552 and had particularly antagonistic 
designs towards the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Ottoman and 
Spanish Empires left the struggle for the Mediterranean and directed 
their limited resources and military powers to more critical issues in 
their imperial agendas. In the end, the Ottoman and Spanish 
Empires had lost their primary interest towards one another. 
Although there was an initiative to sign a peace treaty by the 
Spanish Empire, it was concluded as a truce rather than an official 
peace in 1578.35 
1.2. Changing Positions in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
The Ottoman and Spanish Empires witnessed a change in 
conjuncture throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. In this period, 
the positions of the Ottoman and Spanish Empires were seriously 
challenged by the newly rising powers such as England, France and 
Russia. As a result they had lost their status as great powers and as 
primary actors of once, and therefore were reduced to the secondary 
rank in terms of economic and political power. The Ottoman and 
Spanish powers were not reluctant to accept this new status quo and 
                                                 
33 Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, 95. 
34 Braudel, 1142, 1185. 
35 Don Giovanni Marigliano was sent by Philip II as the envoy  to sign the peace treaty 
with the Ottomans. See Kemal Beydilli, “İspanya,” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı  İslâm 
Ansiklopedisi, vol. 23 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınevi, 2001), 165. 
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therefore they resisted this change by different means. These both 
states were forced to transform their financial and political 
institutions due to the changing positions. The Ottomans along with 
the other Mediterranean states saw a gradual decline of the 
Mediterranean as a political arena after the 16th century.36 The 
Spanish, on the other hand, encountered with the new imperial as 
well as commercial rivals such as England, France and Dutch which 
challenged her maritime empire and her commercial and colonial 
relations with America.37 In this time, the North Atlantic gradually 
replaced the Mediterranean as the centre of the world commerce and 
the source of political struggle. As a result of this change, we see no 
major encounter between the Ottomans and the Spanish which had 
lost their primary interest for one another as there was a limited gain 
from a bloody struggle. That is why, the Spanish Empire focused on 
the maintenance of her dominant position in the continent and the 
rise of Protestantism while the Ottomans had to deal with the rising 
Russia and the Safavid Iran in their eastern front and then the 
Habsburg Austria in order to protect the status quo in which the 
Ottoman Empire was still a primary actor.  
1.2.1. The Spanish Position 
The Spanish power in the Atlantic and Europe as the 
dominant power was challenged by England under Queen Elizabeth I 
while the Protestant uprisings in the Netherlands caused a serious 
problem for the Catholic Spain.38 These political and ideological 
problems continued to create an immense burden on the Spanish 
treasure in the 17th century. The maintenance of the Spanish 
overseas empire and protection of her colonies was a costly job. In 
addition to the imperial struggle with England, Spain had to deal 
with the Protestant rebels who were supported by England in the 
Netherlands where the expenses of the Spanish army became too 
high. Spain however was not able to cover these increasing expenses 
as it was the case in the 16th century due to the failure of mobilizing 
her man-power and material sources.39 From the financial point of 
view, the flow of gold and silver from America and taxes on Italian 
trade were unable to fulfill the needs of the Spanish Empire while the 
crown of Castile remained as the most reliable estate since it was 
                                                 
36 Braudel, 1186. 
37 Beydilli, “İspanya”, 164. 
38 Lee, 73-76. 
39 John H. Elliott, “The Decline of Spain,” Past and Present, No. 20 (November, 1961), 
56. 
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ruled and taxed directly.40 In addition to the man-power that can be 
gathered in Castile, an important tax-income can be provided for the 
imperial purposes of Spain. Castile was able to offer these resources 
for the empire in the 16th century but it became increasingly difficult 
to meet this endless demands for man and gold in the 17th century.41 
As a result, we may see that most of the problems of Spain were 
caused by the over-expansion and prolonged armed conflicts which 
exhausted the Spanish treasure.  
As a response to the increasing military expenses Spain 
decided to settle its disputes with her rivals. The Mediterranean front 
was closed when a truce was signed with the Ottomans in 157842. 
This respite was strengthened by other treaties, namely the Franco-
Spanish treaty of Vervins in 159843, the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 
London in 1604 and a truce with the Dutch were signed in 1609.44 
Spain may have sought peace to restore its power and maintain its 
large empire in a century in which she had faced challenges.45 In 
order to deal with the increasing economic problems the Spanish 
statesmen tried to offer solutions. According to them, royal 
expenditures had to be controlled, the tax system had to be 
reformed, and some measures for irrigation and agricultural 
development had to be taken.46 The technological backwardness may 
be put forward for economic problems of Spain because she failed to 
compete with the technological advance of the Western Europe.47  
1.2.2 The Ottoman Position  
The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had no direct 
signs of decline as an economic and political power in the 17th 
century. However, the changing conjuncture forced the Ottomans to 
transform their imperial policies and adopt themselves. The 
Ottomans fought to keep their role as the primary force that 
determine the developments in the international arena but due to the 
decline of the Mediterranean as a field of struggle between the 
Muslim and the Christian worlds and the rise of the Atlantic, this job 
                                                 
40 Paul Kennedy, Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze 
Ekonomik Değişim ve Askeri Çatışmalar, trans. Birtane Karanakçı (İstanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 72-73. 
41 Elliott, 57-60. 
42 Beydilli, “İspanya”, 165. 
43  İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı,  Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. III, part II (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Basımevi, 1977), 121. 
44 Beydilli, “İspanya”, 164. 
45 Paul C. Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621, The Failure of Grand 
Strategy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 2. 
46 Elliott, 65. 
47 Elliott, 67. 
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was increasingly difficult. The Zitvotorok Treaty in 1606 showed the 
fact that the Ottoman Empire was now "negotiating" peace with her 
enemies in equal conditions.48 The Ottomans managed to protect the 
status quo in the European front and even expanded their empire 
into Ukraine in the 17th century.49  However, the Ottoman power was 
challenged by the European powers at the end of the 17th century 
when the Ottoman forces besieged Vienna and caused the formation 
of the Holy Alliance against the Ottoman Empire. After the second 
siege of Vienna and its aftermath of the Holy League (1683-1699) 
which resulted in the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman inability to 
defeat an overwhelmingly better organized enemy force became 
clear.50 Although, the treaty of Karlowitz is strongly emphasized by 
some historians as a turning point and as the beginning of the 
Ottoman decline, it may not be an actual fact because the Ottomans 
were able to fight and support their armies against the forces of the 
Holy Alliance on a vast front stretching from the Morean peninsula to 
the Ukraine, and they were able to provide logistic needs of her 
armies during this 16 years of prolonged conflict which is a 
significant sign of the might of the Ottoman economy and its ability 
to adopt itself to the extreme conditions. Although there were no 
clear signs of deterioration in the Ottoman military and economic 
institutions, the natural limits for the Ottoman advance was reached 
and the Ottomans lost their interest for further advance deep into 
Europe.51 
According to the latest works in this field, the Ottoman 
Empire was able to maintain her status as a major world power and 
succeeded in transforming herself to meet the demands of the 
changing conjuncture in the 16th and 17th centuries.52 For example, 
the Ottomans used capitulations in order to protect the commercial 
activities in the Mediterranean, and they were able to attract even 
the oceanic trade ships into this commercial line.53 The military 
scene had always the first impact on the statesmen and it was not 
different in the Ottoman Empire. After the defeats in the end of War 
of the Holy League in which the Ottoman Empire also had her 
successes, nevertheless they felt a strong need to re-organize their 
army and to improve their logistical system, but the most important 
effect of the war was its incredible financial burden on the Ottoman 
                                                 
48 Jorga, vol. III, 285, 286. 
49 Jorga, vol. IV, 127-141. 
50 Rhodes Murphey, Osmanlı’da Ordu ve Savaş, 1500-1700, trans. M. Tanju Akad 
(İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), 33. 
51 Murphey, 32-34. 
52 Murphey, 211-218. 
53 Ahmet Tabakoğlu, Türk İktisat Tarihi (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2003), 252. 
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budget. By the 17th and 18th centuries, wars were becoming 
increasingly  expensive and difficult to be financed by the middle-size 
states. Although there were significant limitations on the 
mobilization of the Ottoman forces, the Ottomans managed to 
finance the long and devastating wars due to their well-based 
bureaucracy and strong financial institutions.54 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman and the 
Spanish politics were reduced to the secondary status in the 
international arena. Although the Ottomans and the Spanish showed 
a great effort to protect their status as major political powers, they 
witnessed the rise of the Atlantic powers such as England and 
France. In the beginning of the 18th century, War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1713) ended the Spanish position as the primary 
force that dominated the European politics.55 The Ottoman Empire, 
on the other hand, had lost its status of an expanding actor at the 
Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.56 Although the Ottomans managed to 
recover some of it losses, it was no longer the primary actor in the 
international arena. The primary stands of the Ottoman and Spanish 
Empires in the 16th century passed to England and France whose 
imperial and commercial struggle would dominate the international 
relations in the 18th century due to their increasing ability to control 
vast economies with overseas colonies.  
2. THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LATE 18th CENTURY 
During the second half of the 18th century, the most 
important threat for the Ottomans was the rising Russian Empire. 
The Russians aimed to expand toward the south in the Black Sea 
region. In addition, Russia started its modernization during the reign 
of Peter the Great and since then the war was an impulse for their 
reforms. That is why the Ottomans had to deal with a rising force 
which had enormous sources. The Ottoman army, due to the 
superior organization and logistics, was able to prevent any Russian 
attack towards the Ottoman lands in the 16th and 17th centuries, but 
during the 1683-1699 Wars, Russia joined the Holy Alliance in 1686 
and as result of this combined force they managed to capture the 
Azak which had critical importance due to the its location. However, 
the Ottomans defeated the Russian army led by Peter the Great in 
                                                 
54 The Ottomans faced serious challenges when they mobilize their forces, but they 
were able to overcome most of their problems due to the their well-managed 
bureaucracy. See Murphey, 35-57. 
55 Spain had to turn over some of her holdings to Austria, and Britain acquired from 
Spain Gibraltar and the island of Minorca in the Mediterranean. See Beydilli, 
“İspanya”, 164. 
56 Jorga, vol. IV, 231. 
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1711. As a result of this Ottoman victory, the Azak was taken back 
and the Russian advance was halted for half a century. These events 
were the first signs of the future warfare with the Russians 
throughout the 18th century.57  
In addition to the southern route the Russian Empire was 
also aiming to advance towards the Baltic Sea on the North, the 
czars of Russia followed the traditional foreign policy imposed by the 
Peter the Great. The southern route of the Russian advance had 
confronted with the Ottoman resistance while the Russians faced 
Swedish opposition at the North. During the Ottoman-Russian War 
(1768-1774) the Russian Baltic fleet advanced through the North Sea 
and entered the Mediterranean through the strait of Gibraltar. The 
aim of the Russian fleet was to provoke the Greek population of the 
Ottomans and to search and destroy the Ottoman naval force and 
they did succeed at Çeşme where the Ottoman fleet was finally 
destroyed in 177058. This event created the first shock at the 
Ottoman capital because it was the first major act of the Russians in 
the Mediterranean and the Ottomans could not tolerate a second 
one. This purpose would shape the Ottoman foreign policy in the late 
18th century. The second shock came when Crimea became 
independent as a result of the Ottoman defeat and the Treaty of the 
Küçük Kaynarca with the Russians in 1774.59 The loss of vast 
Muslim population caused the demoralization of the Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire.60 The Ottoman position was weakened due to the 
long and devastating wars, and she was not able to stand against the 
r i s i n g  R u s s i a  a l o n e .  T h i s  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e y  n e e d e d  t o  f i n d  a l l i e s  
through diplomacy. The Ottomans were now in search of new allies 
to balance the increasing Russian power and the hostile coalition of 
Russia and Austria.61  
In addition to their organizational problems, the Ottomans 
suffered from over-extension. There were three major fronts that the 
Ottomans were dealing with, namely the Black Sea, the southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean. As a result, the Ottomans needed to 
follow an intense diplomacy to overcome their strategic problems. 
                                                 
57 Svetlana Oreshkova, "Rus-Osmanlı Savaşları: Sebepler ve Bazı Tarihi Sonuçlar," in 
Osmanlı, vol. 1 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 557. 
58  İ. H. Uzunçarşılı,  Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 4, part I (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1978), 400. 
59 Hasan Şahin, "Kaynarca'dan (1774) Paris Barışı'na (1856) Kadar Şark Meselesi 
Perspektifinde Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetlerine Genel Bir Bakış," in Türkler, vol. 12 
(Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 531-532. 
60 Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, "1774-1789 Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Dış Politikası," in 
Türkler, vol. 12  (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 546. 
61 Sarıcaoğlu, 550. 
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When the Ottoman Empire abandoned its policy of unilateral act, she 
decided to find reliable allies through intense diplomacy in  order to 
defeat her better organized enemies.62 The first choice for alliance 
was Sweden which had confronted with the Russian aggression at 
the Baltic Sea. She was eager to cooperate against this common 
enemy. The Ottomans and Swedish were the targets of the traditional 
Russian policy which aimed to expand into the warm waters. That is 
why, both of them saw Russia as a major threat to their integrity. 
The first treaty of alliance with Sweden had been signed in 174063 
and a second one could respond the Ottoman needs in the late 18th 
century, thus the second treaty of alliance with Sweden was signed 
in 178964. There were mainly two expectations; the first was to deter 
Russia by creating a joint front which depends on Ottoman sources, 
still impressive, and the Swedish military intelligence. The second 
reason was to prevent the Russian Baltic fleet from accessing the 
Mediterranean. Sweden could control the Baltic fleet of the Russian 
Empire if they could manage to control the Strait of Sunt.  
In southern Europe, a strong continental power to check the 
Russians as well as Austrians, was needed. Prussia was one of the 
major European powers which could respond the Ottoman needs. A 
long process of negotiation resulted in the treaty of alliance with 
Prussia which was signed in 1790,65 against both the Austrian 
aggression in Southern Europe and against the Russian threat at the 
North. The treaty of alliance with Prussia was especially in favor of 
the Ottomans, because it provided Prussian support against the 
Russians and Austrians which was an extraordinary diplomatic 
success.66 In the Mediterranean front, the need to control the 
entrance of the Mediterranean, in the end, motivated the Ottomans 
to welcome the Spanish envoy.  
2.1. The Re-Establishment of Ottoman-Spanish Relations 
In the second half of the 18th century, the Bourbon monarch 
Carlos III, the former King of the Two Sicilies, became the king of 
Spain. When he was the king of the Two Sicilies, he had initiated the 
normalization of the Ottoman-Sicilian relations, and that is why he 
signed the Treaty of Trade and Friendship with the Ottomans in 
1740.67 Since the Two Sicilies was a relatively small state, Ottomans 
                                                 
62 Uzunçarşılı, IV, I, 247. 
63 Uzunçarşılı, 294. 
64 Uzunçarşılı, 543-546. 
65 Kemal Beydilli, 1790 Osmanlı-Prusya  İttifakı:  Meydana Gelişi, Tahlili, Tatbiki 
(İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1984), 67-70, Uzunçarşılı, 559. 
66 Beydilli, 67-70. 
67 Uzunçarşılı, IV, II, 240. 
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did not hesitate to grant them capitulationary rights because there 
was not any political expectation for the Ottomans from such a state. 
Carlos III, when he became the king of Spain due to his Bourbon 
ties, wished to normalize the Ottoman-Spanish relations during the 
reign of Mustafa II but Sadrazam Koca Ragıp Paşa who was 
responsible for the talks, died during the negotiations in 1763, and 
thus negotiations ended.68 Carlos III resumed his efforts in 1779 and 
sent his envoy Don Juan de Bouligny, a leading merchant69, to the 
Sublime Porte to establish political and economic relations with the 
Ottoman Empire.70 The Spanish Empire could clearly benefit from 
the direct commercial relations with the Ottomans. However, the 
main concern of Spain was to prevent the attacks of the gazis who 
were based in North Africa through the support of the Ottoman 
authorities. The gazis were causing serious damage on the flow of 
Spanish commercial activities and they also could conduct organized 
raids against the Spanish ports.  
2.2 The Negotiations 
Although the Ottoman concerns were much different than the 
ones held by the Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Bouligny, they decided 
to start talks to further understand the position of Spain and to 
search for benefits that could be exploited. However, the Ottomans 
neither accepted nor rejected the Spanish offers because 
normalization of relations was not an immediate concern for them. 
On the other hand, they could not tolerate to alienate Spain 
especially after the recent Russian activities in the Mediterranean. 
The Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Bouligny wanted that the 
Treaty of Trade and Friendship signed with the Two Sicilies in 1740, 
to be the basis for the Ottoman-Spanish Treaty of Peace and Trade.71 
The Ottomans who could not simply say "no" to the Spanish envoy, 
followed a policy of slowing the talks down. The Ottomans argued 
that Spain is not equal to the Two Sicilies in terms of political and 
economic power, and as a result, a similar treaty simply could not be 
granted as it was the case in 1740. The Ottoman Empire was not 
willing to accept the Spanish terms without taking something in 
return. The Ottomans hoped that they could convince Spain for a 
political treaty or even military cooperation against the Russian 
                                                 
68 Ahmet Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. II (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1891), 184. 
69 Don Juan de Bouligny was a quite remarkable character. He engaged in the efforts 
to establish a National Bank and worked on the plans to improve the national 
economy of Spain. See Earl J. Hamilton, "Plans for a National Bank in Spain, 1701-
1783," The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 57, no.4 (August, 1949), 326. 
70 Uzunçarşılı, IV, II, 242. 
71 Cevdet, II, 184. 
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Empire which became a serious threat for the Mediterranean since 
1770. In 1779 Reisü'l-Küttab Abdürrezzak Efendi, the Ottoman 
official responsible for the talks, showed the Ottoman demands as 
the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar72 in the case of an enemy act 
against the Ottomans and secondly, as the release of Muslim 
prisoners who were held in Spain. Bouligny stated that Spain could 
not control the Strait of Gibraltar due to the lack of power.73  
Meanwhile Halil Hamid Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab. 
Bouligny, after consulting to his capital, informed the Ottomans that 
the issue of Muslim prisoners can be handled by sending them to 
İstanbul.74 In August of 1779, the Ottoman statesmen who gathered 
to discuss the critical situation in Crimea, also discussed the talks 
with the Spanish envoy.75 The discussion on what the Ottoman 
position should be, was inconclusive and as a result, they decided to 
ask the opinion of the Sadrazam who was not present in this 
meeting.76 Meanwhile, the Spanish Empire declared war on the 
British which engaged warfare with the Bourbon France because of 
colonies in America, and surrounded their forces in the Gibraltar. 
Although Bouligny tried to offer some terms on the besieged 
Gibraltar in return of the prevention of attacks of North African 
gazis, this event did not create an immediate expectation for the 
Ottomans because the success of the Spanish attack was not 
imminent.77  
The Ottomans who were not really very eager to sign a 
commercial treaty with the Spanish, decided to get rid of Bouligny by 
bringing forward some obstacles which were not related to the 
Spanish.78  The Ottomans thought that they succeeded when they 
heard no news from Bouligny for a while but 7-8 months later, in 
September 1780, the ambassador of the Two Sicilies informed the 
Sublime Port that Bouligny did not leave for Spain and he was still in 
İstanbul. He also added that he was charged to assist the 
negotiations.79 After a while Bouligny reappeared with two issues. 
The first one was the question on the position of ships. "How should 
the Ottoman and Spanish vessels act when they encounter? Should 
they act hostile or friendly?" Another issue was the question of the 
                                                 
72 The Srait of Gibraltar is referred as the Strait of Septe in the Ottoman documents as 
well as in Tarih-i Cevdet. However I would use the common name, Gibraltar. 
73 Cevdet, II, 184-185. 
74 Cevdet, II, 185. 
75 Beydilli, "İspanya", 166. 
76 Cevdet, II, 185. 
77 Beydilli, "İspanya", 166. 
78 Cevdet, II, 185-186. 
79 Beydilli, "İspanya", 166. 
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Spanish relations with the North African gazis. The Spanish Empire 
wished to make peace with them. "Could the Ottomans issue an order 
to motivate them for peace with the Spanish?" The Ottomans stated 
that these issues were related to the Kaptan Paşa, the grand admiral, 
so they should wait his return. 80 As a result of the second attempt of 
Bouligny to advance in the talks failed, the Ottoman tactics of 
slowing down continued with success.   
When Süleyman Fevzi Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab, 
Bouligny gave two more proposals to the Ottoman government. The 
first one was a demand for an imperial order (ferman) that previously 
had asked for the North African gazis to be motivated for peace with 
Spain. The second one was the demand of the extension of the Treaty 
of the Two Sicilies so that it would include the Spanish Empire 
within the framework of friendly relations.81 On the other hand, the 
Ottoman side insisted on a political cooperation between the 
Ottomans and the Spanish. After the evaluation of the Spanish 
demands and views of the Ottoman statesmen, Sultan Abdülhamid I 
ordered to start the weekly negotiations for the Ottoman-Spanish 
treaty in 1781. The Swedish King ordered his chargé d'affaires in 
İstanbul to support the negotiations of the Spanish envoy with the 
Ottomans. The Swedish chargé d'affaires argued accordingly that 
Spain should be held in the anti-Russian camp. Reisü'l-Küttab 
Süleyman Fevzi Efendi, Beylikçi Hayri Efendi, the Spanish envoy 
Don Juan de Bouligny, his translater and the Swedish dragoman, 
Ignatius D'Ohsson attended the meetings.82  
Süleyman Fevzi Efendi argued that they needed a basis for 
the treaty, Bouligny suggested that the Treaty of the Two Sicilies to 
be a basis. However Süleyman Fevzi Efendi opposed that idea by 
arguing that time and place had changed so they needed to have a 
political benefit from such a treaty.83 The Ottoman side worked on a 
political treaty a long with the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. They 
wanted to have a written confirmation of the friendship of the 
Spanish Empire, so the Ottomans wished to have a political 
document. Bouligny who was exhausted because of the Ottoman 
tactics of diplomacy, finally erupted: "I have been here for three 
years, I spent one year in roads, why do not  you give me a positive or 
negative answer?" The Ottoman response was even more depressing: 
"these businesses can not be handled with haste."84  
                                                 
80 Cevdet, II, 186-187. 
81 Cevdet, II, 187-188. 
82 Cevdet, II, 188-189, Beydilli, "İspanya", 167. 
83 Cevdet, II, 190. 
84 Cevdet, II, 190-191. 
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In the second meeting, Don Juan de Bouligny insisted on an 
answer to the Spanish terms, and Süleyman Fevzi Efendi said that 
other articles can be determined once the basis was decided on. 
Bouligny repeated that they could be sure of the friendship and 
neutrality of Spain but added that he was not authorized to sign 
anything except the terms of the Treaty of Trade and Friendship that 
was signed with the Two Sicilies. The Ottoman side responded that 
the gesture of good will is not enough in inter-state relations, they 
needed to be written down.85 In the third meeting, Bouligny stated 
that Spain needed something in return for the principle of neutrality, 
and the title of Padişah should be given to the Spanish King as it was 
given to the French King. Süleyman Fevzi Efendi said that this title 
was given to the French King after a long period of friendship and 
alliances. As a result, Spain could not expect anything in return of 
not helping enemies of the Ottoman Empire because it had already 
been so.86  
The rest of the articles, like the release of Muslim prisoners, 
the issue of an imperial order for North African gazis for peace with 
Spain, and the prevention of the attacks of Christian corsairs to the 
Ottoman subjects, were nearly complete.87 When most of the terms 
were agreed upon, the Spanish envoy Bouligny stated that the 
Ottoman Empire should not help enemies of the Spanish Empire. 
This was also a critical issue because the status of North African 
gazis were not clear. Despite of their independent acts, they were 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the term "enemy" was 
replaced by "Christian" and determined as the "state of war with the 
Christian states" because according to the Islamic law, the Ottoman 
Empire as the major Islamic state was obliged to help Muslim states 
who asked for any type of support.88  
Bouligny was still insisting on an imperial order for North 
African gazis on the assumption that they were already willing to 
make peace with Spain. On the other hand, Kaptan Paşa investigated 
the issue and informed Süleyman Fevzi Efendi. According to him, 
North African gazis were still fighting with Spain and they even 
recently had captured a number of Spanish ships, and they had no 
wish to make peace with Spain since they make their living by these 
corsair acts.89 Bouligny said that he was again noticed by his capital 
that he should strictly stay within the framework of the terms of the 
                                                 
85 Cevdet, II, 191-192. 
86 Cevdet, II, 192-193. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Cevdet, II, 193. 
89 Cevdet, II, 193-194. 
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Treaty of Trade and Friendship that was signed with the Two Sicilies. 
Thereupon the Ottoman translater of the Divan-i Hümayun met 
Bouligny and tried to convince him to stay until the treaty was 
signed. However, Bouligny complained about the delay and the 
Ottoman tricks. He even threatened the Ottomans that if this treaty 
would not be signed, the whole Bourbon family, France, Spain and 
the Two Sicilies would gave up their friendship with the Ottomans. 
On the other hand, the Ottoman side could not afford to cut off the 
negotiations because Austria and Russia were suspected to be in an 
alliance against the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Ottomans 
informed Bouligny that most of the terms were agreed on and that 
there were just few details that had to be decided. Thus, if he wished 
to give up, it would be his responsibility.90  
Hayri Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab and proceeded with the 
negotiations in 1782. He visited Kaptan Paşa in order to have an idea 
on the North African gazis and the Muslim prisoners. Kaptan Paşa 
explained him that North African gazis should not be forced to make 
peace with Spain, in stead of that, they may have their own right to 
decide on their relations with Spain. According to Kaptan Paşa the 
exchange of prisoners was impossible since  prisoners who were used 
in the navy and the shipyards were completely Spanish and if the 
Ottomans returned them, they could not be replaced. On the other 
hand, Spain had only 150, at most 200 Muslim prisoners, according 
to the intelligence. North African gazis could pay their ransom.91 
Meanwhile the Swedish chargé d' affaires also tried to motivate Hayri 
Efendi to conclude the negotiations positively, and he informed Hayri 
Efendi that if the Ottoman Empire rejected the Spanish offer of 
peace, Spain might turn to the Russian lines which was undesirable 
for both, the Ottomans and the Swedish.92 After the negotiations and 
the contributions of the Swedish chargé d' affaires, the Ottomans 
decided on five principles of neutrality which were supposed to be 
the basis of the Ottoman-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Trade.  
First of all, the Ottoman Empire would not help the Christian 
enemies of the Spanish Empire and would remain neutral. The 
Muslim states were not included into this principle of neutrality. The 
Spanish Empire would not help enemies of the Ottoman Empire 
except for France and the Two Sicilies, and would remain neutral. 
Secondly, this treaty of friendship between the Ottoman and the 
Spanish would be announced to North African gazis, and inform 
them that peace is desired. An imperial order would be issued if 
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necessary. Thirdly, the article on prisoners would be handled 
according to the Treaty of Trade and Friendship that was signed with 
the Two Sicilies. Fourthly, the Spanish Empire would try to prevent 
attacks of the Christian corsairs from Malta and Genoa. And lastly, 
any article which is beneficial to both, the Ottomans and the Spanish 
could be added to this treaty.93 
The Ottoman Empire gave these articles to the Spanish envoy 
Bouligny to be sent to Madrid and they waited for approval. At the 
end, the Spanish King Don Carlos III approved these articles and 
ordered Bouligny to conclude the treaty within thirty days. After the 
negotiations which the Swedish mission had widely supported and 
encouraged, and as a result of Bouligny’s correspondence with 
Madrid, the sides agreed upon the terms of a capitulation (Treaty of 
Friendship and Trade) and a Treaty of Neutrality on September 14, 
1782.94 The ratification process of the treaties was completed in 
178495. This treaty was composed of  twenty-one articles and a 
conclusion.  
2.3. The Treaty of Trade and Friendship in 1782 
According to the Treaty of Trade and Friendship96, 1- The 
Ottoman and the Spanish Empires agreed on the friendly relations 
and signed peace. Thus trade is allowed between the subjects of 
these two powers. 2- The custom rates are fixed at %3 within the 
framework of friendly relations. 3- The Spanish Empire is allowed to 
have her representatives in the Ottoman territories and ports. They 
                                                 
93 Cevdet, II, 200-201. 
94 "… En Constantinopla a 14 Septiembre de 1782." See Articulos De Paz y Comercio 
Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana en Constaninopla a 14 de septiembre de 1782 por 
el ministro plenipotenciario de S.M. el Sr. D.Juan de Bouligny y el de la misma Puerta 
El Haggi Seid Muhamed Baxa, gran visir. En virtud de los plenos poderes que se 
comunicaron y canjearon reciprocamente cuyos articulos fueron ratificados por el Rey 
Nuestro Senor en 24 de diciembre se 1782 y por la Puerta en 24 de Abril de 1783 y 
sus ratificaciones canjeadas en Constantinopla el mismo dia 24 de abril, habiendo 
llegado a Madrid de la Puerta en noviembre del propio ano. (Madrid, Imprenta Real, 
1783) 23. (the Spanish version of the 1782 Treaty. I was given by the Institute of 
Cervantes on February 1, 2007.) 
95 Beydilli, “İspanya”, 167. 
96 The text of the treaty was taken from Tarih-i Cevdet, but I compared it with the 
Spanish version that I received form the Institute of Cervantes on February 1, 2007: 
Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana. I thank valueble 
director of the Institute of Cervantes, Pablo Martin Asuero for translation. I here give 
an overview of the treaty,  the full text can be found in Tarih-i Cevdet. See Cevdet, II, 
338-343. 
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would be treated like the representatives and translators of other 
friendly powers.97 4- Free passage of the subjects of the King of 
Spain in the Ottoman territories including the Holy Places is granted. 
The article sets rules to ensure that the inheritances of deceased 
Spanish subjects will not be confiscated by the Ottoman authorities 
but returned to the Spanish consulates. The same rules are set for 
the Ottomans in the Spanish territories.98 5- The Spanish consuls or 
their translators would be allowed to attend in the trade courts 
related to commercial dealings. The same right is granted for the 
Ottomans in the Spanish territories. 6- The Ottoman Empire will not 
arrest any Spanish without a cause. And if there is a cause, they will 
inform the Spanish consulates. 7- The Ottoman subjects and 
merchants are free to make trade in the Spanish territories. An 
Ottoman consulate will be established in Alicante99  to deal with any 
possible problems affecting them. 8- The Ottoman authorities will 
help the Spanish vessels in their waters if damaged in storm. 9- The 
sides will not disturb their military vessels. 10- This article regulates 
the quarantine issues. 11- This article deals with the method of 
salutation when the Ottoman and the Spanish vessels encounter. In 
critical situation, they would help each other. 12- The subjects of the 
Spanish Empire would only convert to Islam in the presence of the 
Spanish consulates. 13- This article guarantees the lives and 
properties and their safe return in case of piracy. 14- This article 
determines the good treatment to the prisoners and their return in 
exchange of ransom. 15- This article deals with the smuggling and 
sets the punishments. 16- The Spanish and the Ottoman Empires 
would not let the enemy powers to chase the vessels of any sides in 
their waters. 17- The Ottoman Empire would inform the gazis in 
North Africa that their peace with Spain is desired.100 18- There 
would be no production of warships for the enemies of the Ottoman 
and the Spanish Empires in their shipyards. Authorities in the 
                                                 
97 Especially after the ratification of treaty the Spanish consulates started to open in 
mostly eastern Mediterrranean shores like Lebanon. See The document on the 
establishment of the Spanish consulate in Lebanon, İspanya Ahkam Defteri, 
A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0001. 
98 The right to travel of the Spanish subjects is accepted, but the terminology which is 
used in the texts is quite different. For example Cevdet mentions "seyyah/traveler" 
while the spanish document uses the word of pilgrimage; "… en la exercio de la 
Religion, y en la peregrinacion de Jerusalen…" See Articulos De Paz y Comercio 
Ajustados Con La Otomana, 7. To compare also see Cevdet, II, 338-339. 
99 The word Alicante is not clear in Tarih-i Cevdet, but I check the spanish version to 
be sure; … que resida en la Ciudad de Alicante… See Articulos De Paz y Comercio 
Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana, 11. To compare also see Cevdet, II, 339.  
100 This article regulates the original aim of the Spanish peace initiative, the 
elimination of corsair threat. See Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La 
Puerta Otomana, 17-18. 
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Ottoman and Spanish ports will not allow the enemy sneak attacks 
to friendly vessels. 19- This article regulates the customs for the 
consulates and the free trade policies except the strategic materials 
like gunpowder and cannons. 20- The Ottoman and Spanish 
currencies will be valid in the commercial activities. No extra tax will 
be issued. 21- No extra taxes would be demanded by the Ottoman 
government from the subjects of the Spanish Empires. If necessary, 
any additional tax would be negotiated.101  
2.4. The Spanish Mission 
After the re-establishment of the relations between the 
Ottoman and the Spanish Empires, Don Juan de Bouligny became 
the first permanent representative of the King of Spain at the 
Ottoman court. First of all, the Bouligny family had an interesting 
story. They were three brothers; Jose, Juan and Francisco. They 
engaged in slave trade in the late 18th century. They were the sons of 
Juan Bouligny from Marseille and Maria Paret from Alicante. Jose 
had been unsuccessful in his commercial activities, Francisco was 
an officer and became the governor of Luisiana, and lastly Juan was 
sent to İstanbul.102 He had to deal with the establishment of the 
embassy and the problem of translation. Bouligny also started to 
work on the reports about the general status of the Ottoman Empire 
as a part of his mission.103 Bouligny soon understood the necessity 
of dragomans to carry out the relations with the Sublime Port. 
However, there was no trained Spanish translator, and that is why 
Bouligny had to make use of non-Muslim Ottomans and the 
Italians.104 As a result of this situation Bouligny proposed to his king 
to establish a "School of Language" for the Spanish boys. He also 
emphasized that if this school was established in İstanbul, boys 
would also learn the Turkish culture and traditions a long with the 
language.105 In 1784, a small Spanish fleet under the command of 
Gabriel de Aristizabal arrived at İstanbul along with the presents 
from Don Carlos III for the Ottoman Sultan.106 Don Juan de 
                                                 
101 Cevdet, 338-343. 
102 
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371307544582795222257/p
0000001.htm, May 7, 2007. 
103 Antonio Jurado Aceituno, "Bir Filolog Olarak Dragoman," in İspanya Türkiye: 16. 
Yüzyıldan Günümüze Rekabet ve Dostluk, ed. Pablo Martin Asuero, trans. Peral Bayaz 
Çarum (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 223. 
104 Aceituno, 219. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Eloy Martin Corrales, "İspanya-Osmanlı İlişkileri, 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllar," in İspanya 
Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Rekabet ve Dostluk, ed. Pablo Martin Asuero, trans. 
Peral Bayaz Çarum (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 236-237. For the Ottoman 
decrees on the acceptance of these ships into Turkish waters and the assistance see 
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Bouligny continued his mission but after the French assault on 
Egypt, he was accused of being a French collaborator as he was 
declared persona non grata. He was deported along with his Swedish 
and Dutch colleagues D'Ohhson and von Dedem in 1799.107 
                                                                                                                  
As a result, the Spanish King, Don Carlos III initiated this 
peace process between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires. He 
was eager to establish direct economic and political relations. From 
now on Spain could meet the Eastern Mediterranean without 
intermediaries, trade increased and thus the Spanish consulates 
started to open. The interaction between the Spanish and the 
Ottomans gradually increased.108 On the other hand, although the 
Spanish side had no desire for it, the Ottomans were successful in 
getting the Treaty of Neutrality with Spain which shows the ability of 
the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th century. Along with the 
Treaty of Friendship and Trade, the Treaty of Neutrality would be 
expected to serve the Ottoman needs in the critical period of 1780s 
since the Spanish Empire at least would not help the enemies of the 
Ottoman Empire, namely Austria and Russia. However, we should 
not forget that Spain was already in the Bourbon alliance and 
coordinated its foreign policy with France and the Two Sicilies. In 
addition to the political aspect of the treaty, Russia as an autocratic 
power did not look very sympathetic to relatively liberal Bourbons 
and that may have been an emotional aspect of the attitude of Don 
Carlos III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the Ottoman and Spanish Empires were the 
major world powers until the end of the 16th century, but they lost 
their aggressive interest towards each other due to the change in 
their political and economic targets at that period. In the 17th and 
18th centuries, they were longer able to play primary roles in the 
international arena since their positions were challenged by new 
rivals. In the late 18th century, the Ottomans and the Spanish 
understood that the relations have to be re-established because of 
 
İspanya Ahkam Defteri, A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0004 (order 7-8). The rest of the related 
decrees on the assistance to the Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean, and some 
other minor issues related to Bouligny's period of duty. For example some of his 
documents were stolen by bandits and the Ottoman capital alarmed the governors of 
Rumeli, see İspanya Ahkam Defteri, A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0004 (order 9). 
107 Beydilli, "İspanya", 168. 
108 Corrales, 236-239. 
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the needs of diplomacy. It is also true that the Ottomans did not 
make any attempt to normalize their relations with Spain but the 
Bourbon monarch Don Carlos III initiated the peace-process for 
mainly commercial reasons and of course to avoid the attacks of 
gazis in North Africa. Why were the Ottomans reluctant to make 
peace with Spain? According to Cevdet Paşa, they could not truly 
understand the importance of trade. However, it is quite reasonable 
for the Ottomans to expect political benefits from such a re-
approachment because the late 18th century was a period of 
disasters for them and they would welcome any help. The alliance 
with the Spanish Empire, as I emphasized, could serve the Ottoman 
needs like the control of Gibraltar. That is why, the Ottoman side 
successfully insisted on the political terms along with the Treaty of 
Trade and Friendship which was finally signed on September 14, 
1782 thanks to the efforts of the Ottoman statesmen and of course 
the Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Bouligny. 
We can not be sure if there was an Ottoman policy of re-
approachment with Spain before the late 18th century, but we may 
understand the logic behind this agreement. The alliance between 
the Russians and the Austrians realized the worst nightmares of the 
Ottomans. Thus, they had to balance this enemy coalition with new 
friends and allies. We can not know if the Ottomans had a strategic 
plan of forming a unified front. However, we may see the results of 
the Ottoman diplomacy. There were three pillars of the Ottoman 
diplomacy to curb the Russian as well as Austrian aggressions. The 
first pillar was unexpectedly formed by the Spanish Empire when 
Carlos III sent his envoy to the Ottoman capital for a simple 
capitulation. The Ottomans managed to get the Treaty of Neutrality 
with Spain in 1782. The second pillar was going to be the traditional 
Swedish alliance due to their hostility with the Russians and the 
second Treaty of Alliance with Sweden was signed in 1789. The third 
pillar was an important success for the Ottoman diplomacy. The 
Prussians were convinced to sign an alliance for both against the 
Austrians and the Russians. Thus, The Treaty of Alliance with 
Prussia was signed in 1790.  
As a result, the Ottomans and the Spanish Empires, the 
Great Powers of once, lost their status as the primary actors at the 
same time. They were no longer the well respected and glorious 
empires of the 16th century. They could not follow the technological 
and financial advance of the North European states and they were 
accused of being culturally unable to advance in terms of the 
capitalist development. The Ottoman and the Spanish at least came 
together in 1782 but then it was too late for developing a solid base 
of relations. Soon the French Revolution shook the thrones of the 
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monarchs, while the Ottoman Empire was dealing with the Ottoman-
Austrian and the Ottoman-Russian Wars (1787-1792). Furthermore, 
both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires would face aggression from 
the Napoléonic France in the beginning of the 19th century. The 
invasions of Napoléon also carried the new ideas of nationalism 
which was mortal for the empires. On the other hand, although their 
vast empires vanished, the Turks and the Spanish are still living 
same Mediterranean culture an thus they are closer than ever. 
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